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Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: The
Need for Enhanced Surveillance
Epidemic influenza, an age-old infectious
disease, kills approximately 20,000 men and
women in the United States every year. The
emergence of influenza viruses bearing novel
surface antigens in 1918 (A/H1N1), 1957
(A/H2N2), and 1968 (A/H3N2) led to three
worldwide pandemics of disease and more than
600,000 deaths in the United States. During the
influenza pandemic of 1918-19, 500,000 deaths
were reported, with persons younger than 65
years of age accounting for 99% of all influenza-
related deaths (1).
Because it establishes the scientific founda-
tion for a public health response, surveillance is
the single most important tool for identifying
new or reemerging infectious diseases with
potential to cause serious public health
problems. Surveillance can be useful in rapidly
identifying and monitoring persons at highest
risk, changes in disease rates, modes of
transmission, and groups at risk. Surveillance
can help in planning and evaluating disease
prevention and control programs and can
improve capacity to control annual epidemics
as well as the next influenza pandemic. The
outbreak of human infection with H5N1
(avian) influenza in Hong Kong in 1997
highlighted the potential of new and lethal
pathogens to emerge unexpectedly and
questioned the capacity of local and state
health agencies to expand surveillance activi-
ties in response to a possible pandemic
influenza strain.
In 1993, a Working Group on Influenza
Pandemic Preparedness and Emergency Re-
sponse (GrIPPE), which included influenza
experts from the public and private sectors,
began to develop an updated, comprehensive
blueprint for an action plan for pandemic
influenza for the United States (2). GrIPPE
identified surveillance as a key component of the
pandemic plan. The group has also recognized
that to effectively address the threat of an
influenza pandemic, measures to reduce the
impact of influenza must be in place and
operational at the state and local level now,
during the prepandemic period. Because more
influenza-related illness and death occur in the
aggregate during regularly recurring influenza
epidemics than during the pandemics them-
selves, GrIPPE has attempted to link its plan to
other relevant public health initiatives such as
those related to emerging infections and adult
immunization.
In 1994, the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists (CSTE) was asked by GrIPPE to
participate in the national pandemic influenza
planning process. As part of this effort, CSTE
conducted a survey of state epidemiologists in
March 1995 to assess current influenza
surveillance systems; all 50 states and the
District of Columbia responded. Questions
sought to determine the source and type of
illness reports received, the type of virologic
surveillance activities performed, the states
perceived preparedness for a pandemic, ob-
stacles in detecting a new pandemic strain, the
need for a pandemic plan specific to the states
jurisdiction, whether more influenza surveil-
lance would be conducted if additional resources
were made available, and how much increased
surveillance would cost.
All 51 respondents reported at least one
source of influenza surveillance information,
and 39 (77%) identified sentinel physicians as
the primary source of disease reports. Forty-
eight (94%) states had the capability, through
some private or public health laboratory, to
identify influenza viruses isolated in tissue
culture. Of 47 laboratories that indicated to what
degree they could characterize influenza viruses,
37 (79%) could subtype the viruses, while 10
(21%) could identify viruses only as influenza A
or B. Another 1995 survey by the Association of
State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory
Directors  of its membership was more specific in
defining influenza virologic resources available
at each states public health laboratory, with 10
(20%) states indicating no state public health
laboratory capacity to isolate viruses and 13
(25%) state public laboratories reporting no
ability to subtype influenza isolates (A. Di Salvo,
pers. comm.).
In the CSTE survey, 34 (67%) states
responded that their laboratory surveillance
system would be adequate to detect a new
pandemic virus, with 29 (57%) states indicating
that their disease surveillance system would be
adequate. Among the reasons given for the
difficulty in detecting a new pandemic strain
were inadequate financial resources (20 [83%]),
inadequate personnel (19 [79%]), and low disease
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Only 29 (59%) states reported that an
influenza pandemic plan specific for their
jurisdiction was needed. Reasons for not
developing a state pandemic plan included lack
of resources 4 (31%), insufficient interest 4
(31%), and the perception that pandemic
influenza did not pose an immediate threat 3
(23%). However, if targeted resources were made
available, 44 (86%) respondents indicated that
they would increase laboratory surveillance for
influenza, and 39 (76%) indicated they would
increase disease surveillance activities. The
estimates provided for increasing surveillance
activities were $2,000 to $100,000 (mean $37,602)
for laboratory surveillance and $2,000 to $100,000
(mean $40,914) for disease surveillance.
In the United States, public health services
(including surveillance) are provided most
directly by municipal, county, and state health
departments, or a combination of all three. The
1995 CSTE survey found that many states lacked
surveillance activities dedicated to influenza;
however, many states would expand virologic
and disease-based surveillance systems if
nominal resources were made available, despite
the lack of urgency given to any pandemic
planning effort at the state level.
Several efforts have been undertaken at the
national level to respond to the states needs and
to promote enhanced preparedness for pandemic
influenza. A Pandemic Influenza Planning
Guide for State and Local Health Officials was
developed as a result of these efforts. The guide
provides a checklist or set of guidelines for states
to develop their own pandemic plan. A draft
guide was pilot-tested in six sites during
February-March 1998.
The surveillance component of the planning
guide calls for enhancements in virologic and
disease-based surveillance and improvements in
surveillance information systems. Specifically,
the planning guide recommends that during the
prepandemic period 1) virologic surveillance
capability be improved by ensuring that at least
one laboratory in each state or major
metropolitan area can isolate and subtype
influenza viruses; 2) disease-based surveillance
capability be improved by expanding the existing
sentinel physician network, with the aim of
establishing a population-based system of
approximately one sentinel physician per
250,000 population; 3) contingency plans be
developed for enhancing state and local virologic
and disease-based surveillance systems in the
event of a novel virus alert or pandemic alert;
and 4) electronic and telecommunications
capability with neighboring jurisdictions and
with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) be enhanced.
Because the antigenic properties of influenza
viruses change constantly, surveillance to
monitor the changes and their impact is
necessary. One type of surveillance information
without the other is of limited value.
Although a disease-based surveillance sys-
tem for influenza is in place in the United States,
the system is in jeopardy because of the
misperception that influenza is no longer an
important public health problem and because of
continued erosion of resources supporting the
public health infrastructure at the state and
local levels. Moreover, influenza surveillance is
compromised because influenza is not a
nationally notifiable disease.
One component of the existing surveillance
system is weekly reports to CDCs national
notifiable disease system from each state
epidemiologist designating the level of influenza
activity during the preceding week. Levels of
estimated activity are reported as widespread,
regional, sporadic, or nonexistent. The validity of
these estimates has long been questioned, since
they may primarily reflect local interest or
availability of resources. Data on associated
disease incidence are only rarely collected.
Many states lack the financial resources for
influenza virologic surveillance, which is critical
for monitoring antigenic drift and shift of
influenza viruses circulating among humans and
is the basis for each years vaccine formulation.
State public health laboratories that perform
virologic surveillance have a continuing need to
culture and characterize isolates on a timely
basis. Submissions of specimens for virus
isolation are expected to decrease as rapid
antigen test kits are improved and become more
widely available. Having fewer isolates for
characterization is a potential public health
problem.
The demands of pandemic planning have
prompted CDC and CSTE to begin changing
influenza surveillance. The premise of changes is
that a solid surveillance infrastructure must be
in existence during the prepandemic period.
Disease- and laboratory-based surveillance is
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explored as potential sources of additional
qualitative or quantitative data. Efforts are
under way to upgrade the sentinel physician
network by enlisting and retraining more
participants, integrating influenza reporting
with other state-based systems, standardizing
reporting procedures, and developing a
semiautomated data management system to
provide rapid feedback. Twenty-eight states and
the District of Columbia pilot-tested steps to
revise the existing sentinel physician surveil-
lance system during the 1997-98 influenza
season. One benefit of such efforts may be to
increase the publics, medical providers, and
public health practitioners understanding of
influenza as a potentially preventable disease.
A national plan is an important first step in
highlighting the public health problem posed by
influenza and the need to identify ways in which
the federal, state, and local public health
community can combine efforts to address the
problem.
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